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to receive social security benefits in retirement,11 eligibili y is
assured for life so long as the individual continues to receive
social security benefits.12
For purposes of the family-owned business deduction, the
requirement is different.  The drafters of the FOBD provision
patterned the material participation test after the original
special use valuation enactment (passed in 1976) in requiring
material participation for five or more years “during the 8-
year period ending on the date of the decedent’s death.”13
The drafters did not include the 1981 amendment easing the
pre-death requirement by requiring material participation
only for five or more years during the eight year period
ending with the earlier of retirement disability or death.14
This is a significant (and dangerous) difference in the two
tests, particularly in light of the statutory statement for FOBD
that the material participation requirement is imposed “within
the meaning of section 2032A(e)(6).”15  Clearly, section
2032A(e)(6) only specifies the standard for determining the
adequacy of involvement, not the standard in determining the
period when material participation is required.16
Post-death test:  Special use valuation and FOBD
The post-death or recapture tests for material participation
appear to be identical for purposes  of special use valuation
and FOBD.
For special use valuation, absence of material
participation for more than three years in any eight-year
period ending after death results in recapture of special use
valuation benefits.17  The FOBD rules state that recapture
occurs if, within 10 years after the date of the decedent’s
death, “the material participation requirements described in
section 2032A(c)(6)(B) are not met….”18  Thus, the FOBD
rules basically adopt the post-death material participation
requirement, both with respect to the amount of involvement
required and with respect to the period when material
participation is required.19 The two tests are identical.
In conclusion
The differences in the pre-death test for the material
participation requirement are particularly unfortunate in light
of the obvious resemblance of the rules in the pre-death
period and in the assurance in the post-death period that the
FOBD rules are to utilize the special use valuation rules.
Quite clearly, the wise approach would be to amend the
FOBD material participation test as was done in 1981 for
special use valuation20 to require material participation only
for five or more years before the earlier of retirement,
disability or death.21  Unless so amended, some decedents are
likely to fail the pre-death material participation test for
FOBD.
FOOTNOTES
1 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii) (special use
valuation), 2057(b)(1)(D)(ii).  See 5 Harl, Agricultural
Law §§ 43.03[2], 44.03 (2000); Harl, Agricultural Law
Manual §§ 5.03[2], 50.04[7] (2000).
2 See 5 Harl, Agricultural Law § 41.06 (2000) (rules on
imputation of activities by employee or agent to property
o ner as principal).
3 I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1).
4 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
5 I.R.C. § 2057(b)(1)(D)(ii).
6 See notes 9-16 infra and accompanying text.
7 I.R.C. § 469(h)(1).
8 Id.
9 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C), before enactment of Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Sec. 421(b)(2), adding I.R.C.
§ 2032A(b)(4), (5).  See 5 Harl, supra note 1, §
43.03[2][d][vi].
10 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C), 2032A(b)(4).
11 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(4)(A)(i).
12 See note 9 supra.
13 I.R.C. § 2057(b)(1)(D).
14 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C), (4).
15 I.R.C. § 2057(b)(1)(D)(ii).
16 See I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
17 I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(6)(B).
18 I.R.C. § 2057(f)(1)(A).
19 Id.
20 S e note 10 supra.
21 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C), (4).  See note 10 supra.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CLAIMS. The debtors’ Chapter 12 plan had listed a
creditor’s junior mortgage as an unsecured claim since the
prior secured claims against the property exceeded the value
of the property. The creditor had initially objected to the
characterization of the claim but failed to object to
confirmation of the plan. After the debtors received their
discharge, the property was sold and the creditor required a
payment in order to release the lien. The debtors argued that
the payment violated the discharge and sought return of the
payment. The creditor argued that Dewsnup v. Timm, 502
U.S. 410 (1992) prohibited the stripping of the secured status
of the lien. The court held that Dewsnup was limited to
Chapter 7 cases and that lien stripping was allowed in
Chapter 12 cases. The court also held that the debtors had
taken affirmative action to void the lien as unsecured by
filing a Section 506 motion and by including the claim as
unsecured in the plan. The court held that the avoidance
extinguished the lien such that, after discharge, no lien
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remained to be enforced against the property of the debtors;
therefore, the payment for release of the lien was in violation
of the discharge and had to be returned to the debtors. In re
Zabel, 249 B.R. 764 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2000).
TRUSTEE FEES. The Chapter 12 debtors’ plans provided
for direct payments to secured creditors and direct transfer of
collateral to secured creditors, both without payment of
trustee fees. The trustee argued that the lower courts had
applied a broad rule that all Chapter 12 plan payments could
be made directly to creditors, but the appellate court held that
the lower courts correctly applied the holding of In re
Wagner, 36 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1994)that direct payments to
secured creditors could be made if the creditors were
sophisticated enough and the payments did not adversely
affect the feasibility of the plan. The appellate court held that
the lower courts had determined that the plan was feasible
with the direct payments and that the creditors were
sophisticated enough to protect their interests in the secured
claims. Haden v. Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466 (8th Cir. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The IRS had filed secured
and unsecured claims for taxes owed by the debtor. The
debtor’s Chapter 11 plan provided for full payment of the tax
claims but did not include payment of post-petition interest
on the unsecured claim. The IRS sought collection of the
post-petition interest after the debtor received a discharge and
the debtor argued that the collection effort violated the
discharge. The court held that the claim for post-petition
interest survived the bankruptcy as a personal obligation of
the debtor. The court also held that the failure to include the
post-petition interest in the plan did not estop the IRS from
collecting the interest because such interest is prohibited from
being collected from the estate by Section 502(b)(2). In re
Stacy, 249 B.R. 683 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000).
CONTRACTS
HEDGE-TO-ARRIVE CONTRACTS .  The plaintiff was
a grain producer which entered into hedge-to-arrive contracts
with a grain elevator. The contracts allowed the plaintiff to
rollover the delivery date each year but added charges for
each rollover. The plaintiff argued that the contracts were
void as illegal, off-exchange futures contracts. The court
noted that the plaintiff was in the business of producing grain
and the defendant was in the business of purchasing grain for
delivery to other customers; the contracts charged a fee for
the rollover option; and the plaintiff warranted in the contract
that it would make delivery. The court held that the contract
was a forward contract with intended delivery exempt from
the securities and exchange laws and not void for illegality.
Sack Bros. v. Tri-Valley Coop., Inc., 260 Neb 312 (2000);
Sack Bros. v. Great Plains Coop., Inc., 260 Neb 292
(2000).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT . The plaintiffs, a non-profit
organization, a private firm and an individual challenged
regulations promulgated under the Animal Welfare Act, 7
U.S.C. § 2131 et seq., which excluded birds, rats and mice
from the definition of animals covered by the Act. The
USDA challenged the standing of the individual plaintiff,
arguing that the plaintiff had not suffered any injury from the
regulations. The individual was a research lab assistant and
claimed emotional distress from the poor living conditions of
the mice and rats under the individual’s care. The court held
that the individual’s emotional distress was sufficient injury
for standing to sue and that the lack of regulation of the care
of the mice and rats resulted from the USDA’s failure to
promulgate regulations covering mice and rats. The court also
held that the Act did not give the USDA unreviewable
discretion to determine which animals were to be regulated.
The Act defined the covered animals as “any live or dead
dog, cat, monkey (non-human primate mammal), guinea pig,
hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal . . ..” The
court refused to grant a summary judgment for either party
because insufficient evidence had been presented to
determine whether the regulations were reasonable under the
Act. Alternatives Research & Development v. Glickman,
101 F. Supp.2d 7 (D. D.C. 2000).
BEEF PROMOTION . The plaintiff was a cattle buyer
who purchased cattle for resale on almost a daily basis. Under
the Beef Promotion and Research Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2901 et
seq., the buyer of cattle must withhold $1 per head of cattle
purchased from the amount paid the seller and pay the
withheld amount to the state or federal beef council. An
exception applied to cattle resold within 10 days after an
assessed sale. The plaintiff failed to report and pay for these
assessments, although the case does not state whether the
plaintiff collected the assessments. The plaintiff was ordered
to pay the assessments and a civil penalty based upon the
plai tiff’s sales and other records. The plaintiff challenged
the assessments, arguing that the plaintiff’s lack of records
provided no basis by which the USDA could make an
as essment. The court upheld the assessment because the
plaintiff provided no evidence that cattle sales did not occur
durin  the periods for which no records existed. The plaintiff
ar ued that the three-year recordkeeping requirement in the
“Collecti n/Compliance Guide” created a three year
limitation period on assessments. The court held that the
Guide was not part of the statute or regulations and was not
binding on the USDA assessments. The plaintiff also argued
that most of the cattle sales occurred within 10 days after a
purchase; however, the plaintiff did not provide receipts or
other evidence to support this claim and the court held that
the evidence demonstrated that the assessments were based
on sales made more than 10 days after a purchase. Goetz v.
United States, 99 F. Supp.2d 1308 (D. Kan. 2000).
FARM LOANS. The plaintiffs had secured a loan
guaranteed by the USDA but had defaulted on the loan. The
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plaintiff had sought another loan but the USDA refused and
accelerated the loan, causing the plaintiffs to eventually lose
their farm. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages from the
USDA with a suit under the Tucker Act, alleging that the
USDA had breached express and implied warranties in the
contracts. The court held that monetary damages were not
available because the plaintiffs did not bring an action for
violation of any statute or regulation which provided for
monetary damages. The court held that, without a clear
statutory or regulatory authority for damages, the USDA had
not waived its sovereign immunity from suit. Harriman v.
USDA, 99 F. Supp.2d 105 (D. Me. 2000).
MIGRANT WORKERS . The defendants were held to
have violated several provisions of the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.,
including failure to withhold and pay social security benefits,
failure to keep accurate and complete employment records,
and failure to maintain federal and state health and safety
standards. See Elizondo v. Podgorniak, 70 F. Supp.2d 758
(E.D. Mich. 1999). The issue in this case was the number of
violations for which separate sanctions could be awarded.
The plaintiff workers had worked for the defendants over two
harvesting seasons, from June to September in 1996 and
1997. The plaintiffs left the defendants’ labor camps during
the nonharvesting season. The court held that separate
violations occurred for each harvest season and that separate
violations occurred for each section of MSWPA violated.
However, the court held that, because the failure to withhold
and pay social security taxes and to pay minimum wages both
were violations of 7 U.S.C. § 1822(a), these violations were
to be combined for each plaintiff into one violation for
purposes of assessing fines. Elizondo v. Podgorniak, 100 F.
Supp.2d 459 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
SUGAR. The CCC has announced that, based on the
combination of market prices below forfeiture levels,
forfeitures expected this year, a greater excess supply outlook
for the next crop, CCC holding sugar inventory with no other
specific disposal plan, and U.S. sugar producers' growing
realization of the major market problems facing the sugar
sector, CCC is implementing a Sugar Payment-In-Kind (PIK)
Diversion Program to help reduce the amount of forfeitures
otherwise expected, and to eliminate CCC's sugar inventory,
thereby also eliminating storage costs. 65 Fed Reg. 51280
(Aug. 23, 2000).
SWINE. The GIPSA has issued proposed regulations
which amend its regulations to implement the Swine  Packer
Marketing Contracts subtitle of the Livestock Mandatory
Reporting Act of 1999. The proposed regulations establish a
library or catalog of types of swine marketing contracts used
by packers to purchase swine and to make information about
the types of contracts available to the public. The proposed
regulations establish monthly reports of estimates of the
numbers of swine committed for delivery to packers under
types of existing contracts contained in the library or catalog.
65 Fed. Reg. 53653 (Sept. 5, 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
PENDING LEGISLATION . The President has vetoed the
repeal of the estate tax and the U.S. House of Representatives
failed to override the veto.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The decedent’s will
established a trust for the decedent’s heirs, surviving spouse
and religious beneficiaries. The religious beneficiaries
included a church, a college and “missionaries preaching the
Gospel of Christ.” The estate claimed a charitable deduction
for the value of the trust interest for the religious
ficiaries. The estate sought a state court interpretation of
the will and the state court held that the term “missionaries
preaching the Gospel of Christ” was descriptive of the
members of the college and church. The District Court
rejected the state court interpretation and held that the
deduction was not allowed because some of the beneficiaries,
the “missionaries preaching the Gospel of Christ,” were not
qualified charitable organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
The estate claimed that the term “missionaries preaching the
Gospel of Christ” was descriptive of the church, but the
District Court interpreted the phrase as a separate class of
beneficiaries. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
state court interpretation was the more likely intent of the
decedent. The appellate court allowed the charitable
deduction because the estate property passed to the church
and college, two charitable organizations. Es . of Starkey v.
United States, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,381 (7th
Cir. 2000), rev’g, 58 F. Supp.2d 939 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
GIFT . The taxpayer transferred improved real property to a
church by contract for deed in 1994. The sales price was
substantially lower than the fair market value of the property.
The taxpayer retained legal title to the property and the right
to recover the property in case of default. The church took
possession of the property and was required to maintain the
property but could not assign or transfer the property without
the taxpayer’s consent.  Under the contract, the church was to
make monthly payments, but in 1997, the taxpayer conveyed
th  legal title to the church in exchange for a mortgage and
note. The court examined Texas law to determine whether a
sale was completed at the time the contract for deed was
executed and held that, under Texas law, the sale was
completed. Because the sale was completed in 1994, the
transaction was considered a bargain sale eligible for the
charitable deduction for the difference between the sales
price and the fair market value of the property. Musgrave v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-285.
TRUSTS. These cases involved irrevocable trusts which
filed petitions in the Tax Court for review of assessments
made by the IRS. The petitions were signed by the
“managing director” but not by the persons designated as
trustees by the trust instruments. The trust instruments did not
define the term “managing director” or prescribe the duties
and authority of the managing director. The designated
trustees failed to sign the petition even after ordered to do so
by the court. The court held that it had no jurisdiction over
the case because the petition was not properly executed since
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it was not signed by the designated trustees and the managing
director did not have the capacity to bring the action. PM
Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-272; Malvern Hills
Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-273; BHC Trust v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-274; YMO Trust v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-275; AL Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-276.
VALUATION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
under I.R.C. § 2702 to provide that issuance of a note, other
debt instrument, option or similar financial arrangement does
not constitute payment for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702. A
retained interest that can be satisfied with such instruments is
not a qualified annuity interest or a qualified unitrust interest.
In examining all of these transactions, the IRS will apply the
step transaction doctrine where more than one step is used to
achieve similar results. In addition under the final
regulations, a retained interest is not a qualified interest under
I.R.C. § 2702, unless the trust instrument expressly prohibits
the use of notes, other debt instruments, options or similar
financial arrangements that effectively delay receipt by the
grantor of the annual payment necessary to satisfy the annuity
or unitrust interest amount. Under these provisions, in order
to satisfy the annuity or unitrust payment obligation under
I.R.C. § 2702(b), the annuity or unitrust payment must be
made with either cash or other assets held by the trust. The
proposed regulations provide a transition rule that, if a trust
created before September 20, 1999, does not prohibit a
trustee from issuing a note, other debt instrument, option or
other similar financial arrangement in satisfaction of the
annuity or unitrust payment obligation, the interest will be
treated as a qualified interest under I.R.C. § 2702(b) if (1)
notes or other debt instruments are not used after September
20, 1999, to satisfy the obligation, (2) any note or notes or
other debt instruments issued on or prior to September 20,
1999, to satisfy the annual payment obligation are paid in full
by December 31, 1999, and (3) any option or similar
financial arrangement is terminated by December 31, 1999,
such that the grantor actually receives cash or other trust
assets in satisfaction of the payment obligation. For purposes
of this section, an option will be considered terminated if the
grantor is paid the greater of the required annuity or unitrust
payment plus interest computed under I.R.C. § 7520 or the
fair market value of the option. 65 Fed. Reg. 53587 (Sept. 5,
2000).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING . The taxpayer company
purchased various goods for resale to food retail outlets. The
taxpayer entered into exclusivity contracts with various
suppliers which paid the taxpayer advances for the taxpayer’s
agreement not to purchase similar goods from other suppliers.
The taxpayer used the accrual method of accounting. The
taxpayer treated the advances as loans since the advances had
to be repaid if the taxpayer purchased goods from another
supplier or did not purchase sufficient quantities within a
certain period. In a field service advice letter, the IRS ruled
that the advances had to be included in income when received
because the advances were to be treated as exclusivity
payments and deferral of reporting until the goods were
purchased would distort income if the advances were
received in one year and the goods were sold in another tax
year. FSA Ltr. Rul. 200035018, May 31, 2000.
C CORPORATIONS
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer was the
sole shareholder of a corporation. The taxpayer was accused
of tax evasion for taxes owed when the company was
operated as a sole proprietorship. The corporation; however,
paid all of the legal fees for the taxpayer’s defense and the
taxpayer was eventually acquitted of the charges. The
taxpayer was very important to the operation of the company
but did not present evidence that the possible incarceration or
fines at could have occurred in the criminal case would
have damaged the corporation. The court held that the
corporation’s payment of the taxpayer’s personal legal fees
wa  a constructive dividend because the taxpayer failed to
prove that the payment of the fees was made to protect the
business interests of the corporation. Hood v. Comm’r, 115
T.C. No. 14 (2000).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS . The
taxpayers sued the manufacturer of a fungicide, claiming
tortious injury to their nursery business. The suit was settled
and the taxpayers received a payment, of which $500,000
was allocable to their claim of injury to their business
reputation. The taxpayers argue that damages received on
account of injury to business reputation are, as a matter of
law, received on account of personal injuries within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). The court disagreed and held
that the payment for injury of the taxpayers’ business
reputation was included in gross income. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the $500,000 allocated to loss of
business reputation was damages received for personal
injury. The court stated that, although the taxpayers did not
state their case against the manafuacturer in terms of personal
injury or negotiate the settlement in terms of a personal
injury, the taxpayers did receive settlement proceeds for the
loss of business reputation which was a personal injury.
Fab y v. Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,682
(11th Cir. 2000), rev’g, 111 T.C. 305 (1998).
The taxpayer left employment with a company after the
company offered early termination benefits. In order to
receive the additional benefits, the taxpayer signed a release
of all claims against the company and agreed not to seek
similar employment elsewhere and to reimburse the company
for some of the benefits if the taxpayer was rehired. The
taxpayer claimed that the taxpayer raised an age
discrimination claim with the company prior to receiving the
termination benefits, but the taxpayer did not file any law
suits to enforce the claim. The court held that the early
termination benefits were included in gross income as part of
the employment severance program and not in satisfaction of
any personal injury claim. The case is designated as not for
publication. Marenin v. Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,689 (N.D. Calif. 2000).
DEPENDENTS. In a Chief Counsel Advice, the IRS ruled
th t the parents of a kidnapped child may claim a dependency
exemption for the child in the year of the kidnapping but may
not claim the exemption in later tax years in which the child
remained missing and the parents maintained a room for the
child and incurred search expenses. Even though the IRS
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applied a presumption of support for the year of the
kidnapping, the presumption was not applied in later years,
even though the first presumption arose because no one else
was eligible for the exemption. The discussion did not raise
the issue of the survival of the child in the later years. Query:
in the later tax years, if the child is presumed alive, who else
would be eligible for the exemption? The case precedent
cited for support of the ruling by the IRS involved a parent
seeking the exemption for a child kidnapped by the other
parent.  CCA Ltr. Rul. 200034029, July 25, 2000.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . The IRS has issued a Chief
Counsel Advice letter on the income tax consequences of
three hurricane relief programs enacted by the North Carolina
legislature. One program provided interest-free, three year
loans to small and mid-sized business not eligible for SBA
loans. The second program provides quick cash advances for
businesses which have applied for SBA loans, with the
advances repaid from the SBA loan proceeds. The third
program grants SBA loan recipients an amount of money
equal to the SBA loan costs for three years. The IRS ruled
that the amounts received under the first two programs are
not included in taxable income and that no deduction is
allowed for the repayment of the amounts. The amount
received under the third program is included in taxable
income and the taxpayer may deduct the annual interest costs
of the SBA loan which accrue in each taxable year. CCA
Ltr. Rul. 200034025, June 8, 2000.
On August 21, 2000, the president determined that certain
areas in Ohio were eligible for assistance under the Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a
result of severe storms and flooding on July 29, 2000.
FEMA-1339-DR. On August 17, 2000, the President
determined that certain areas in the District of Columbia were
eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of a severe
storm on August 7, 2000. FEMA-1338-DR. On August 17,
2000, the President determined that certain areas in New
Jersey were eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of
severe storms, flooding and mudslides on August 12, 2000.
FEMA-1337-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a
loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the loss on his or
her 1999 federal income tax return.
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP COSTS . The taxpayer
was an electrical utility. As part of its maintenance of
production plants, the utility removed asbestos. In a field
service advice letter, the IRS ruled that, because the utility
did not treat the asbestos as a separate depreciable asset but
as part of the production plant, the cost of removal and
replacement of the asbestos had to be capitalized in the basis
of the production plant and was not deductible as a current
expense. FSA Ltr. Rul. 200035021, June 1, 2000..
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that, for the
period October 1, 2000 through December 31, 2000, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 9 percent (8
percent in the case of a corporation) and for underpayments
at 9 percent. The interest rate for underpayments by large
corporations is 11 percent. The overpayment rate for the
portion of a corporate overpayment exceeding $10,000 is 6.5
percent. Rev. Rul. 2000-42, I.R.B. 2000-__.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSION . The taxpayer
corporation lost business assets in a storm and was able to
repair or replace most of the assets. However, some of the
replacement assets were acquired by the taxpayer acquiring
another, unrelated corporation which owned business assets
similar to the assets lost in the storm. The acquired
corporation also owned other business assets. In a field
service advice letter, the IRS ruled that the acquisition of the
other corporation was not a purchase of like-kind property
and the taxpayer would have to recognize any gain from the
transaction. The taxpayer received insurance proceeds from
the loss of property. The taxpayer received a preliminary
amount in one tax year, with the remainder two years later.
The IRS ruled that, to the extent the initial payment exceeded
the taxpayer’s basis in the lost property, gain had to be
recognized in the first year, with the remainder of the gain
recogn zed when the full amount was paid. FSA Ltr Rul.
200035002, May 2, 2000.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . A parent corporation
exchanged its license to operate a radio station for a
television station license owned by a subsidiary corporation.
The IRS agent argued that the assets exchanged were not
like-kind because the operation of a radio station involved
different kinds of broadcasting property, including
commercials, client bases and equipment. The IRS ruled,
however, that the focus was to be placed on the nature of the
licenses exchanged and ruled that the licenses were like-kind
property. Ltr. Rul. 200035005, May 11, 2000.
LOSSES. The taxpayer was a professional gambler and had
three years of net losses from wagers and expenses. The court
held that the limitation in I.R.C. § 165(d) on deduction of
loss s from wagers and expenses to the amount of winnings
applied whether or not the taxpayer was in the trade or
business of gambling. Praytor v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
200 -282.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION . The General Services
Administration has released a final rule updating the
maximum per diem rates for locations within the continental
United States. The list increases or decreases the maximum
lodging and meals and incidental expenses amounts in certain
existing per diem localities, adds new per diem localities and
removes some previously designated per diem localities. The
list is effective on Oct. 1, 2000, and applies for travel
performed on or after Oct. 1, 2000.
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS. The taxpayer was a tax-
exempt private foundation which planned fencing of a
riparian area to control livestock access to a stream. The
taxpayer set-aside the funds for the project because the
project could not begin until inclement weather subsided. The
project was expected to be completed and paid for within 60
months after the set aside of the funds. The IRS ruled that the
set aside funds would qualify as a distribution under I.R.C. §
4942(g)(2)(B) and would not be subject to the excise tax
under I.R.C. § 4942. Ltr. Rul. 200034036, May 31, 2000.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENSES . The
taxpayers invested $50,000 each in a partnership company
formed o “further research and development of technology
involv d in” reusable and recyclable plastic containers. The
taxpayers claimed to materially participate in the company
and claimed the $50,000 contributions as research and
development expenses. However, the taxpayers provided no
evidence of the use of the funds by the company nor of the
activities performed by the taxpayers in the company. The
court held that the contributions were not deductible because
the taxpayers failed to substantiate the use of the funds or
their activities in the company. The court rejected the
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argument that the mere investing of the $50,000 was
sufficient participation. The appellate court affirmed in a
decision designated as not for publication. Sheehy v.
Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,699 (9th Cir.
2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-183.
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS . The taxpayers,
husband and wife, received social security benefits in the tax
years involved. The taxpayers also received workers’
compensation benefits from a private insurer and the social
security benefits were reduced by the amount of workers’
compensation received. If the workers’ compensation
payments were included in the total amount of social security
benefits, the taxpayers had to include 85 percent of the total
social security benefits in income. The taxpayers argued that
the workers’ compensation benefits were not social security
benefits for purposes of the taxation of the social security
benefits because the workers’ compensation payments were
not paid by the Social Security Administration. The court
held that I.R.C. § 86(d)(3) was clear that any workers’
compensation benefits received in lieu of social security
benefits were to be treated as social security benefits for
purposes of taxation of social security benefits. Mikalonis v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-281.
TAX LIEN.  The defendant was an attorney who
represented a taxpayer involving several years of tax
negotiations with the IRS. The taxpayer had been assessed
for income taxes and had been charged with several counts of
excise tax evasion. The defendant represented the taxpayer in
the case and negotiations with the IRS. This representation
gave the defendant knowledge of the taxes owed by the
taxpayer. However, prior to the IRS filing a notice of tax lien,
the taxpayer granted the defendant a security interest in the
taxpayer’s property to secure the taxpayer’s obligation to the
defendant for the legal services provided and for the retainer
in the criminal case. The court held that, under In re Haas, 31
F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 1994), a prior recorded security interest
has priority over a federal tax lien even if the secured creditor
has knowledge of the federal tax liability at the time the
security interest was created. United States v. Fletcher, 249
B.R. 808 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1999).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HAY BALER. The plaintiff was employed by a farm
owner who purchased a hay baler manufactured by the
defendant. Although the purchaser was the employer, the
plaintiff signed the sales agreement for the employer. The
plaintiff received personal injuries from using the hay baler
as part of the employment on the farm and sued the
manufacturer for breach of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for intended use. The defendant
moved for summary judgment on the issue that consequential
damages on this action were excluded as part of the sales
agreement which contained language that the warranties did
not include liability for consequential damages. The plaintiff
argued that the warranty limitation was void as
unconscionable because the plaintiff had no opportunity to
bargain for or against the limitation. The court, however, held
that the determination of unconscionability was to be made as
to the buyer, the plaintiff’s employer, and not as to the
plaintiff. The court also held that the plaintiff had sufficient
authority to sign the purchase agreement and that the
wa ranty limitation was not unconscionable as to the
employer because no evidence was presented that the
employer did not have sufficient expertise or opportunity to
object to the limitation. Blevins v. New Holland North
America, Inc., 97 F. Supp.2d 747 (W.D. Va. 2000)
PESTICIDES. The plaintiff purchased a termiticide
manufactured by the defendant and applied it around the
plaintiff’s house. Eight days later, the plaintiff filed suit  for
common law fraud, breach of warranty, negligent
misr presentation, violation of RICO, unjust enrichment and
civil conspiracy, alleging that the termiticide did not work.
Th  plaintiff alleged that the defendant made representations
on the label and in advertisements about the efficacy of the
product and that such statements were the basis of the suit
and not the EPA label requirements. The plaintiff argued that
the suit was not pre-empted by FIFRA because the EPA did
not require any efficacy information from licensed
manufacturers. The court held that all of the plaintiff’s claims
were based on information contained on the label, including
information included in advertisements; therefore, the claims
were pre-empted by FIFRA. The court further held that the
RICO claim was pre-empted because the subject matter of the
suit was best handled under FIFRA. The court also dismissed
the suit because the plaintiff failed to allege any damages
which could have occurred during the eight days the
termiticide was used before the suit was filed. J rman v.
United Industries Corp., 98 F. Supp.2d 757 (S.D. Miss.
2000).
ZONING
FARM USE. The plaintiff’s property was originally part of
a 337 acre sheep farm. The farm was divided among three
owners into three separate parcels; however, the farm was
still operated as one unit. The plaintiff purchased one 101
acre parcel in the same year that farming was ceased on the
whole 337 acre original farm. The plaintiff intended to
develop the land for residential use. The evidence
demonstrated that the 101 acre parcel was marginally suitable
as pasture and was not the main portion of the sustainable
original farm. The county zoning board had approved the
plaintiff’s change of zoning to rural residential because the
101 acre parcel was not used in farming. The state appellate
zoning board remanded the case for determination of whether
the 101 acre parcel had been part of a farm unit under the
circumstances. The court upheld the remand, holding that the
nature of the ownership of the land, the management of the
land under one business and the nature of the land itself were
all factors in determining whether the 101 acre parcel was
part of a “farm unit” and used for agricultural purposes. The
court noted that the sale of the parcel did not change the
nature of the land or of its use; otherwise, the zoming laws
could be circumvented merely by the sale of the land and
changing its use. Riggs v. Douglas County, 1 P.3d 1042
(Or. Ct. App. 2000).
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
in Grand Island, Nebraska
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
October 3-6, 2000 Best Western Riverside Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law in the heartland of American
agriculture. Attendance is limited for this wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law.
The seminar will be Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, October 3-6, 2000 at the Best Western Riverside Inn in
downtown Grand Island, NE. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm
and ranch estate tax planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday,
Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes
comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break
refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction
planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounts are available at the hotel.  Be sure to tell them that you are attending the agricultural law
seminar.
The seminar registration fees    for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The
registration fees for     n nsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700, respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are
higher for registrations within 10 days prior to the seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. A registration
form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
